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Abstract:  
This article builds on the idea of actor-network theory to use role terminology for describing the 
heterogeneous associations that make up technological innovations. Referring to key concepts of 
sociological role theory it proposes a more elaborate role-theoretical approach to socio-technical 
networks. It is argued that technological innovations consist of fields of positions to be occupied 
by human actors or techno-logical artifacts. Network-building thus is viewed as a process of estab-
lishing sets of interrelated positions. Consequently, actors and objects are relevant only in their 
capacity as occupants of positions. The role-theoretical approach draws attention to the fact that 
the human and nonhuman components of a technological innovation may hold several positions 
within the socio-technical network and may play functional and social roles at the same time. The 
conceptual approach is illustrated with two examples from the history of the automobile: the chauf-
feur problem and the invention of the jaywalker. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a crucial insight, gained through the last three decades of research on the sociology and history 
of technology that technological innovations consist not only of technological artifacts but of sets 
of interrelated heterogeneous components. Accordingly, each successful innovation requires its 
components to become mutually adapted to each other, resulting in a sufficiently consistent and 
coherent behavior by the constellation as a whole. However, it seems to be difficult to arrive at a 
theory of technological innovation that incorporates this insight without running into conceptual 
difficulties. Approaches that conceive technological innovations as socio-technical systems or het-
erogeneous networks in one way or another face the following conceptual dilemma: Mutual adap-
tion means that the heterogeneous elements are similar in that they may become subject to (re-
)definitions, which – if successful – turn them into suitable components of the innovation. Yet they 
are as different as heterogeneous elements can be: Some are humans others are objects, some have 
been around for some time others are newly invented, some are involved in already established 
social, economic, political, cultural, organizational or functional arrangements others have still to 
find their place, and so on. Thus, the conceptual dilemma is that taking the heterogeneity of the 
elements seriously makes it difficult to stick with the assumption that they all are to be treated as 
components of a technological innovation. On the other hand, to stick with this assumption makes 
it difficult to take the elements heterogeneity seriously. 
This article presents a role-theoretical approach to socio-technical networks that shows a way 
out of this dilemma. At the core of sociological role theory is the distinction between person, posi-
tion, and role. As I will argue, this distinction paves the way to an approach that allows to concep-
tualize technological innovations as networks of mutually adapted components and to take account 
of these components heterogeneity. The key to the solution is that it is the positions of the compo-
nents of a socio-technical network that are subject to processes of mutual adaption and not (or only 
derivatively) the humans or the objects occupying them. Two other notions from sociological role 
theory prove to be most helpful for understanding socio-technical networks: The first is that posi-
tions exist only in relation to other positions thus constituting position fields, sets of related posi-
tions. The second is that positions usually allow their occupants to hold other positions as well. 
This leads to an understanding of socio-technical networks as structures that consist of different 
position fields and of elements which may occupy positions in these different position fields. As I 
will argue, each successful innovation consists of at least two position fields which co-constitute 
socio-technical networks: an effect-related and a use-related position field. This conceptualization 
allows to acknowledge differences between the functional and social features of the components 
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of technological innovations without ignoring that functional features may be provided by human 
actors and social features by technological artifacts. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, I will address the use of role terminology in actor-net-
work theory. Over the last decades actor-network theory has been the most influential approach to 
spread the notion that technological innovations are heterogeneous networks. Therefore, it is worth 
noting that proponents of this approach have repeatedly employed role terminology to express their 
views (2.). Second, I will argue that there are several conceptual problems with how actor-network 
theory applies role terminology which call for a more elaborate role-theoretical approach (3.). The 
theoretical components of this role-theoretical approach to socio-technical networks is presented 
in the then following four sections (4., 5., 6., 7.). Subsequently, I will introduce the difference 
between the effect-related and the use-related position fields of technological innovations (8.) and 
point to role conflicts which may result from the fact that components of innovations may hold 
positions in different position fields (10.). Both aspects will be illustrated with an empirical exam-
ple: the chauffeur problem (9.) and the invention of the jay walker (11.). The article will finish with 
some considerations about implications of the approach presented in this paper (12.) and a short 
conclusion (13.). 
2. The use of role terminology in actor-network theory 
Michel Callon uses role terminology to describe the interrelated activities of different entities re-
quired for a particular technological innovation to occur and to succeed. He refers to the everyday 
notion of “playing a role” as “behaving in a fixed way that is defined by others” but applies this 
notion not only to human actors but also to technical artifacts and other non-human entities. In his 
reconstruction of the failed attempt of the French electric utility company EDF to establish the 
electric car in the early 1970s Callon (1986a: 22) argues: “The EDF has defined the roles, and then 
attempts to enroll other entities into them. It binds the functions of these roles together by building 
a world where everyone has his own place. Up to this point, the entities are ones familiar to the 
sociologist. There are consumers, social movements and ministries. But it would be wrong to limit 
the inventory. There are also accumulators, fuel cells, electrodes, electrons, catalysts and electro-
lytes. For, if the electrons do not play their part or the catalysts become contaminated, the result 
would be no less disastrous than if the users rejected the new vehicle, the new regulations were not 
enforced, or Renault stubbornly decided to develop the R5.” 
In a similar way, Callon (1986b) employs role terminology in his reconstruction of the suc-
cessful attempt of a group of scientists to realize a new technique for cultivating the great scallop 
in France. The cultivation technique, which was first implemented in the early 1970s at Saint-
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Brieuc Bay, France, includes the larvae of the great scallop being “anchored to collectors immersed 
in the sea where they are sheltered from predators as they grow” (p. 202). Interpreting the process 
that led to the successful implementation of the new cultivation technique, Callon (1986b: 214) 
argues: “This example mainly shows that the definition and distribution of roles (the scallops which 
anchor themselves, the fishermen who are persuaded that the collectors could help restock the Bay, 
the colleagues who believe in the anchorage) are a result of multilateral negotiations during which 
the identity of the actors is determined and tested.” 
Callon (1986b: 211) thus characterizes a successful innovation as a result of a process “by 
which a set of interrelated roles is defined and attributed to actors who accept them”. According to 
this view, innovators at first envision a scenario (cf. Akrich, 1992a: 174; Akrich, 1992b: 208; Cal-
lon, 1986a: 26), which defines roles for a set of human and nonhuman entities that are supposed to 
assume them. Realizing a technological innovation is a process of enrolling these entities, that is, 
of making sure that they accept the roles proposed for them. This does not mean that innovators 
are necessarily successful in enrolling the relevant entities according to their plans. Some of them 
may refuse to comply or come up with different role definitions. But if a successful technological 
innovation eventually occurs, it is because somehow a sufficiently consistent and coherent set of 
interrelated roles has emerged. 
Madeleine Akrich (1992b: 209) elaborates on this point by distinguishing “between the user, 
as imagined by the designer and the real user”. Similar to Callon she argues “that when technolo-
gists define the characteristics of their objects, they necessarily make hypotheses about the entities 
that make the world into which the object is to be inserted. Designers thus define actors with spe-
cific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, and they assume 
that morality, technology, science, and economy will evolve in particular ways” (p. 207-08). Ac-
cording to Akrich, to design technical artifacts means to inscribe “this vision of (or prediction 
about) the world in the technical content of the new object” (p. 208) and thereby to prescribe par-
ticular roles to users: “The technical realization of the innovator’s beliefs about the relationships 
between an object and its surrounding actors is thus an attempt to predetermine the settings that 
users are asked to imagine for a particular piece of technology and the pre-scriptions (notices, con-
tracts, advice, etc.) that accompany it” (p. 208). Akrich argues that the inscription of a particular 
role in a technological artifact implies the prescription of corresponding roles to human actors. 
Adopting Akrich’s terminology, Latour (1988a) notes that prescription “is very much like ‘role 
expectation’ in sociology, except that it may be inscribed or encoded in the machine” (p. 306). For 
instance, “a traffic light expects that its users will watch it from the street and not sideways” (p. 
306). 
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Consequently, a technology that works needs not only the technical artifact to function 
properly. It also requires that its surrounding human actors adopt the corresponding roles. And vice 
versa the same criterion applies to technological artifacts: To function properly means that the ar-
tifact assumes its proposed role. A technical defect, thus, is an artifact’s failure to play its part 
within the set of interrelated roles. Akrich illustrates this point with the example of an electric meter 
with the property of being easily deactivated by a simple tap, thus giving customers the opportunity 
to consume unbilled electricity. This device, she argues, is defective because “although the contract 
between supplier and consumer remained in force, the meter failed in its prescribed role as the 
material inscription of that contract” (Akrich, 1992b: 218). 
Latour describes technological artifacts as holders of roles as a result of his strategy to under-
stand the meaning of artifacts by identifying the human activities they substitute. He states as a 
general descriptive rule that “every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply imagine 
what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present. This 
imaginary substitution exactly sizes up the role, or function, of this little figure” (Latour, 1988a: 
299). Accordingly, in his reconstruction of the mechanical door-closer, he describes door-closers 
with primitive spring mechanisms as entities that “play the role of a very rude, uneducated porter” 
and “simply slam the door shut” (p. 301). Again, the role description draws attention to the role 
relationship it implies: “The interesting thing with such impolite doors is this: if they slam shut so 
violently, it means that you, the visitor, have to be very quick in passing through and that you 
should not be at someone else’s heels; otherwise your nose will get shorter and bloody. An un-
skilled nonhuman groom thus presupposes a skilled human user” (p. 301). The hydraulic door-
closer, in contrast, which closes the door “slowly with a subtle variety of implacable firmness that 
one could expect from a well trained butler” (p. 302), prescribes quite a different role to its users. 
3. Similarities between humans and technological artifacts as role 
holders 
There are many empirical examples of technological artifacts which are designed and used to as-
sume tasks that would otherwise be performed by humans as holders of particular roles. Sometimes 
the substitution is so direct, that the artifact is named after the role of the human it replaces. An 
example is the “dumb waiter” that came into use in the 18th century in English middle class house-
holds. The “dumb waiter” is a piece of furniture that allows presenting dishes, beverages, and cut-
lery in a readily accessible way so that no waiter is required to serve the company at table. Con-
temporary sources describe it as “a useful piece of furniture, to serve in some respects the place of 
a waiter” (Sheraton, 1803: 203, cited in Heyl, 2004: 217-18), and recommend its use to avoid that 
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intimate conversations are overheard by servants (cf. Heyl, 2004: 217-19). Such examples maybe 
provide the best evidence that applying role terminology to technological artifacts is not just a 
metaphorical embellishment, but a useful way to address similarities between technological arti-
facts and humans in their capacity as role occupants. Based on the considerations from the previous 
paragraph, the following similarities can be identified: 
(1) Similar to human roles technological artifacts are relational entities. Their properties and 
their behavior make sense only in relation to the properties and the behavior of other entities, some 
of which are human actors. Such as the role of teacher presupposes the role of student, the car 
presupposes the car driver, and the camera presupposes the photographer.  
(2) In both cases the relationships are constituted by a correspondence between the behavior 
of one party and the expectations of relevant other parties. Relations between humans as occupants 
of roles substantially rely on correspondences between role behavior and role expectations. Simi-
larly, the car’s acceleration, slowing down or change of direction are related to the car driver’s 
expectations to cause these behaviors by operating the car in a particular way. Vice versa, there are 
expectations about the user’s behavior inscribed in the technological artifact. Cars require particu-
lar bodily movements from car drivers in order to be operated properly. 
(3) For human role occupants to play a role requires that others play their roles as well. A 
teacher will have a hard time in trying to fulfill his or her role if the children in the classroom do 
not assume their roles as students. The reason for this is that roles are relational entities and are 
mutually related by corresponding behaviors and expectations. The same applies to technological 
artifacts: They also play their part only if other entities – humans and nonhumans – play their part 
as well. Without persons in the driver’s seat who assume the role of car driver, cars will not fulfill 
their role as a means of individual transportation. 
(4) The character of both, human roles and technological artifacts, is defined by what they 
contribute to the setting of interrelated entities they are part of. Often the name of the role or the 
name of the artifact reflects their particular contribution: The role of the teacher is to teach that of 
the student to study. It is the role of the dishwasher to wash the dishes and of the word processor 
to process words. Human roles as well as technological artifacts are defined by (sets of) particular 
properties they possess and particular behaviors they show. Thus both thus are defined by behav-
ioral stability with respect to a limited set of behaviors. The substitution of human role behavior 
with technological artifacts relies on this. 
In general, it thus seems to make sense to conceptualize technological objects as holders or 
roles in a way similar to human actors. There are, however, several difficulties with how role ter-
minology is used in actor-network theory. Callon and Akrich claim that the identity of the humans 
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and the nonhumans involved is defined and determined by the roles they assume. At least with 
respect to the human actors in the examples provided above this is somewhat of an exaggeration. 
Only a few of their characteristics and only a small part of their behavior is subject to redefinition. 
Furthermore, the effect on their identity is probably rather limited in most of the cases. How deeply 
will it change the identity of a man working as a fisherman in Saint-Brieuc Bay after learning to 
accept that his role as fisherman now includes cultivating the scallops he wants to harvest? Mod-
erately at best, I would guess. And what impact on a person’s identity will result from him or her 
assuming the role as a competent user of a door-closer? Interestingly, the same kind of skeptical 
questions can be raised with respect to the identity of the objects that serve as technological arti-
facts. The “dumb waiter”, for instance, is being described as “a piece of furniture”. Thus, the iden-
tity of the physical structure that assumes the role of a waiter is obviously not exclusively defined 
by this role. Additionally, and independently from this role, it can be characterized as a piece of 
furniture, as a kind of table to be more precise. Actor-network theory does not provide conceptual 
criteria that allow one to determine which (re-)definitions affect which entities how and why. As I 
will argue below, a cornerstone of sociological role theory, the distinction between person, posi-
tion, and role is most helpful in this respect. 
Another difficulty results from the problem that actor-network theory does not provide criteria 
for determining the boundaries of actor-networks, that is, of the heterogeneous associations that 
constitute a technology that works. As Latour illustrates with the example of the door-closer, each 
network of heterogeneous associations is part of a more extended network and thus “depends on a 
range of other set-ups being aligned. For instance, the groom closes the door only if there are people 
reaching the Sociology Department of Walla Walla. These people arrive in front of the door only 
if they have found maps and only if there are roads leading to it; and, of course, people will start 
bothering about reading the maps, getting to Washington state and pushing the door open only if 
they are convinced that the department is worth visiting” (Latour, 1988a: 308). Consequently, 
Latour (1988b: 160) suggests to analyze extended networks. But, as Akrich notes, there is no other 
criteria of when to stop “apart from the arbitrary one of lassitude” (Akrich, 1992b: 205, n. 1). This 
lack of criteria, however, cannot be tolerated, if the heterogeneous associations are to be conceptu-
alized as sets of interrelated roles. If a role is defined by its relation to one or more other roles, then 
to define roles necessarily implies to define a particular set of roles and its boundaries. As I will 
show below, it is again the distinction between position and role that provides the conceptual tool 
to deal with these difficulties and makes solving the conceptual problem of the boundaries of socio-
technical networks possible. 
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A third difficulty results from the notion of “playing a role” as “behaving in accordance with 
expectations of others”. For the time being technological artifacts do not understand expectations 
of humans in the same way other humans do. Nevertheless, Latour wants to convince us that we 
should study role expectations whether we analyze relations among humans, among nonhumans, 
or between humans and nonhumans (Latour, 1988a: 308). I agree with Latour but not for the same 
reasons. In contrast to the symmetry between human and nonhuman actors assumed by actor-net-
work theorists, to say that a technological artifact or a human actor conforms with certain expecta-
tions in fact does not necessarily mean the same. To deal with this problem, another aspect of 
sociological role theory will prove useful: The distinction between “role taking” and “role making”. 
4. Person, position, and role 
Sociological role theory (cf. Dahrendorf, 1968 [1958]; Linton, 1936: 113-31; Merton, 1957) de-
scribes and analyzes forms of coordinated behavior that occur when the behavior of human actors 
is structured by patterned expectations with which they are confronted because of the social posi-
tions they occupy. In role theory, a role is “the behaviour oriented to these patterned expectations 
of others” (Merton, 1957: 110), while a social position is defined as a “place in a field of social 
relations” (Dahrendorf, 1968 [1958]: 34). According to Merton (1957: 110), the terms position (or 
status respectively)1 and role serve to grasp the connection of the “culturally defined expectations 
with the patterned conduct and relationships which make up a social structure”. Merton and 
Dahrendorf agree that positions are constituted and defined by the set of patterned relations within 
a position field. Positions are, so to speak, the nodes of the network that results from the patterned 
relations between theses nodes. Thus, positions are as stable as the relations between them. 
As a result of occupying social positions their incumbents are required to behave in particular 
ways. According to role theory, these requirements of behavior result from patterned expectations 
placed by others on individuals in their capacity as occupants of these positions. The sets of pat-
terned behavior which corresponds to these expectations constitute the social roles of the incum-
bents. Accordingly, the expectations by others on occupants of positions are called role expecta-
tions and the corresponding bundles of behavior constitute their role behavior. Role expectations 
and role behavior are relational phenomena. They result from relations between social positions. 
Role expectations are expectations on each other that individuals have because they are related to 
each other as occupants of positions. Role behavior is a behavior between human actors who are 
                                                 
1 Linton and Merton use the term status instead of ‘position’. Following Dahrendorf I prefer ‘position’ over ‘status’ 
because, as he argues, in ‘general usage, “status” refers primarily to one particular kind of position, namely, position 
in a hierarchical scale of social prestige’ (Dahrendorf, 1968 [1958]: 65). 
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occupants of interrelated social positions. Roles, therefore, are bundles of position-related behav-
iors where human actors react to position-related expectations of other actors. “Positions merely 
identify places in fields of reference; roles tell us about how people in given positions relate to 
people in other positions in the same field” (Dahrendorf, 1968 [1958]: 36). 
A core characteristic of social positions is that they “may in principle be thought of inde-
pendently of their incumbents” (p. 34). Positions “do not cease to exist when they become vacant” 
(p. 34) and do not depend on the personality or the existence of particular individuals. The admis-
sion to a social position may be regulated by all kinds of requirements, but whoever meets these 
requirements may in principle occupy the position. The same applies to social roles: “Like posi-
tions, roles are in principle conceivable without reference to particular persons” (p. 36). It may 
require particular properties or skills to be able to conform with the particular role expectations but 
whoever meets these requirements may play the role if she or he is in the position to do so. 
Explaining the difference between person and position, Ralph Linton (1936: 113), the found-
ing father of sociological role theory, uses the following analogy: “The relation between any indi-
vidual and any status he holds is somewhat like that between the driver of an automobile and the 
driver's place in the machine. The driver's seat with its steering wheel, accelerator, and other con-
trols is a constant with ever-present potentialities for action and control, while the driver may be 
any member of the family and may exercise these potentialities very well or very badly.” With this 
analogy Linton illustrates his notion that a position is “a collection of rights and duties” (p. 113). 
The duties reflect role expectations by others. The rights result from the incumbent’s role expecta-
tions on incumbents of other positions. Accordingly, these rights and duties are linked with posi-
tions and not with particular persons. They become the rights and duties of an individual only if 
and as long as he or she occupies the corresponding position. 
5. Object, position, and role 
It is perhaps no coincidence that Linton uses an example from the realm of technology to explain 
the difference between person and position. Though he claims to compare the relation between car, 
driver’s place and driving individual only by analogy with the relation between positions and their 
incumbents, his example in fact represents an actual application of role theory. It is not only by 
analogy but literally true that by occupying the driver’s seat of a car the person assumes a position 
which is defined by its relation to other positions and linked with particular role expectations. Most 
interestingly, the position field within which these positions are defined in relation to each other 
consists not only of positions for human incumbents but also of positions occupied by objects such 
as the individual car. Obviously, what constitutes “the car driver” is in many respects defined by 
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“the car”, and the same holds vice versa. Positions are constituted in relation to other positions. 
Consequently, one should not only conceive “the car driver” as a position but also “the car”. 
My suggestion is to consider not only human actors as occupants of positions but objects as 
well. This suggestion is supported by the observation that with technological artifacts there is the 
same difference between individual and position as with human occupants of positions. To clarify 
this, it is helpful to take a closer look at the expectations that are directed at the single technological 
artifact, for instance, by its users: Why do we expect that the particular light bulb will emit light if 
the lamp is turned on? Or why do we expect that the particular car rented at the airport will react 
to movements of the steering wheel in a similar way than our car at home? Because the particular 
object in the socket of the lamp is a light bulb and the particular object rented at the airport is a car. 
In other words, our expectations as users of technological artifacts are based on the assumption that 
the individual objects we are dealing with are occupying particular positions; that the object in the 
socket occupies the position as a light bulb and the object obtained from the car rental clerk occu-
pies the position as a car. Our expectations on their properties and their behavior are derived from 
this assumption. We expect that these objects in their property as occupants of this or that position 
will behave in a particular way. Thus, in a sense quite similarly to that of role theory in sociology, 
our expectations are role expectations while the corresponding behavior is role behavior.  
The relation between the single object and the position it occupies as a particular kind of tech-
nological artifact is in some crucial respects rather similar to the relation between person and posi-
tion: The positions as car, light bulb, or as whatever kind of technological artifact do not depend 
on individual characteristics or on the existence of particular single objects, and they also do not 
cease to exist when they become vacant. The same applies to the roles linked with the positions. 
They as well exist independently from any particular object. 
6. Positional roles as subject of (re-)definitions 
The lack of conceptual criteria for determining which definitions may affect which actors or objects 
how and why is a problem not only for actor-network theory but for socio-technical network ap-
proaches in general. The following considerations by Thomas P. Hughes from his well-known ar-
ticle on large technological systems strikingly illustrate the problem. Hughes (1987: 52) argues: 
“Because components of a technological system interact, their characteristics derive from the sys-
tem.” Accordingly, “the components of technological systems are socially constructed artifacts.” 
However, somewhat later he argues: “Inventors, industrial scientists, engineers, managers, finan-
ciers, and workers are components of but not artifacts in the system. Not created by the system 
builders, individuals and groups in systems have degrees of freedom not possessed by artifacts” (p. 
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54). So all components are equal, but some are unequal to the others. The underlying reason for 
this contradiction is the same which makes proponents of actor-network theory believe in the prin-
ciple of generalized symmetry (Callon, 1986b: 200). The crucial insight that technological innova-
tions require their heterogeneous components to be adapted to each other – and thus to be defined 
or redefined accordingly – has led many authors to the conclusion that it is the entities serving as 
the components which are the subject of these (re-)definitions. 
This conclusion is wrong or at least grossly misleading: It is the positions of the single com-
ponents and the roles related to these positions that are subject of the (re-)definitions and not the 
humans or the objects occupying them. Obviously, this does not mean that the human or nonhuman 
incumbents remain unaffected. But as individuals they are affected only insofar as they are affected 
by the position they occupy and the corresponding roles they are expected to play. Consequently, 
the influence on the nature or identity of the individual may vary greatly. Some positions within 
socio-technical networks require newly inventing and constructing the objects that are able to fill 
them, such as the incandescent light bulb within Thomas Edison’s electrical lighting system (cf. 
Hughes, 1985: 45-49; Schulz-Schaeffer, 2000: 96). Others, however, may be defined with refer-
ence to properties of already existing objects, thus leaving them largely unchanged. Copper in its 
position as conductor in Edison’s lighting system provides an example. The same applies for the 
positions assumed by human actors: Some of them, such as the position of the car driver, impose 
on their incumbents requirements of conduct that may need considerable time to learn and to mas-
ter. Others however, leave their human incumbents largely unchanged. But even when the position 
strongly affects the individual occupant, it never defines its (or his or her) nature or identity com-
pletely. Even the objects that serve as light bulbs have properties that are not derived from that 
position. The fragility of their glass bulbs, for instance, is a property that light bulbs have although 
to be fragile is obviously not desirable for objects in this position. 
I suggest viewing technological innovations as networks of positional roles, that is, as net-
works of positions interrelated through the corresponding roles. Conceptualizing socio-technical 
networks this way solves the first two problems raised above as follows: The boundaries of a socio-
technical network are defined by its position fields. The fields of positions are the particular sets of 
positions which, when placed in relation to each other and filled with suitable candidates constitute 
a technology that works. Thus, it is determined by the positions who or what a component of a 
socio-technical network is and who or what not. Consequently, to know the position fields of a 
socio-technical network means to know its boundaries. 
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Within networks of positional roles, the whole process of interrelating the components by 
adapting them to each other is a process of (re-)defining positions and positional roles. This pro-
vides clear criteria for determining which definitions may affect which actors or objects how and 
why: Subject to the (re-)definitions are positions and the corresponding roles. Actors or objects are 
affected when they are brought to assume particular positions within a developing socio-technical 
network. They are affected because occupying these positions means to conform with the related 
positional roles. But only the part of their identity or nature is involved that is relevant for playing 
these roles.  
7. Role taking and role making 
Playing a role in the sense of responding to expectations by others has two rather different meanings 
and only one of them is applicable to humans as well as artifacts. One meaning of this phrase 
requires that the protagonist understands what others expect from him or her as occupant of the 
role, has reasons to act according to these expectations and thus assumes the role. As long as tech-
nological artifacts do not understand the intentions of others the way humans may, and as long as 
they do not build intentions of their own, this meaning of “playing a role” applies only to humans. 
However, responding to expectations does not necessarily require such an understanding. It can 
also be achieved by defining and implementing certain patterns or sequences of behavior which are 
triggered in a sufficiently reliable manner by certain stimulus events. In this sense it is perfectly 
sound to say that the supermarket cashier responds to the customers’ expectations by scanning the 
labels of the items appearing on the checkout counter, even if his or her scanning behavior is simply 
a reaction to the appearing items as stimulus events, and even if this cashier is a machine and not a 
human actor. Only this second meaning of “playing a role” applies both to humans and artifacts. 
The reason behind these different meanings of “playing a role” is that roles exist “in varying 
degrees of concreteness and consistency” (Turner, 1962: 22). If roles are very well defined, then 
playing a role becomes a process of just enacting the prescribed behavioral patterns. On the other 
hand, the role expectations may be less unequivocal and consequently the role behavior may be 
prescribed in much less detail. If this is the case it is impossible to play the role by relying on 
predefined behavioral patterns. Rather, who assumes roles of this kind necessarily “is creating and 
modifying roles as well as merely bringing them to light; the process is not only role-taking but 
role-making” (p. 22). Since a role “cannot exist without one or more relevant other-roles toward 
which it is oriented” (p. 23) role-making is an interactive process which requires reflection about 
the expectations of others as well as on own expectations. Thus, roles which include role-making 
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are for the time being roles that can be fulfilled only by human actors while roles that only require 
role-taking can be occupied by humans as well as artifacts. 
Some sociologists believe that it always includes role-making when human actors play roles. 
However, if this were true, it would be impossible to replace humans with technological artifacts. 
Yet this happens each time when positional roles once occupied by humans are delegated to ma-
chines and devices. But despite all such delegations and substitutions there is no symmetry between 
human and nonhuman actors as claimed by actor-network theory. The similarity between humans 
and objects as occupants of positions and of the related roles is based on the fact that both can act 
as role-takers. Humans, however, can also act as role-makers. 
8. The functional and the social position field of technological arti-
facts 
Since a positional role does not demand the whole person, human actors can hold different positions 
at the same time. In modern societies, a person “not only can, but as a rule must, assume a number 
of positions, and it may be supposed that the number grows with the complexity of the society. 
Moreover, the position field corresponding to a given position may consist of a multitude of distinct 
referents” (Dahrendorf, 1968 [1958]: 34). A teacher can also be a mother, and while as a teacher 
her position field includes students, parents, and colleagues, her position as mother is part of a 
different position field including at least the position of child and of child’s father. The same, how-
ever, applies for objects as occupants of positions. A light bulb, for instance, may also be a piece 
of recyclable waste. In that case, the object not only occupies a position in the position field of the 
electrical lighting system but in the position field of the recycling system as well.  
The notion that objects as well as humans may hold positions within different position fields 
allows to conceptually grasp a constitutive feature of technological artifacts, a feature which so far 
has caused a lot of trouble for sociologists and historians of technology: Technological artifacts are 
necessarily a part of effect-oriented functional settings and of use-oriented social settings. The 
meaning of technology is to produce desirable effects and to do so reliably whenever the effect is 
desired (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer, 2008). However, what the desired effects are, depends on the tech-
nology’s context of use. Consequently, each technological artifact is part of two different settings: 
the setting responsible for producing the effects provided by the particular technology, and the 
setting within which these effects are used. These two settings are not independent from each other: 
Without contexts of use there would be no desire for particular technological effects. But these 
effects, obviously, would not exist without the settings that produce them. Moreover, both settings 
may overlap with each other to some degree. In empirical reality, effect-related and use-related 
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aspects of socio-technical networks are often intermingled. However, as I will argue, they overlap 
like different positions and roles of a single individual do. Consequently, I suggest conceptualizing 
them as two position fields that co-constitute socio-technical networks: a functional or effect-re-
lated position field and a social or use-related position field. 
Accordingly, I assume that each technological artifact holds a position in a functional as well 
as in a social position field. The underlying structure of this double reference is implied in the 
following considerations by Hans Freyer (1998 [1934]: 62): “Suppose we say that I want a drink 
of water. I must first look for a source of water, then bend down, cup my hand, scoop up the water, 
and so forth. As a correlate of this action (we do not ask how it came about developmentally), a 
particular fragment, ‘the manufacture of a cavity with a thick base’ becomes objectified in form.” 
Thus, “the fragment is separated out of mere action and is (in our case also materially) solidified. 
As the road sign bears a relationship to the pointing finger, so the drinking cup does to the cupped 
hand. And precisely because in the latter case, a mere fragment of a total action constitutes the 
meaningful content of the objectification, the character of the tool is a consequence of the product 
of the action. This is and remains according to its meaning an essential part – the tool is not suffi-
cient unto itself […], it requires a fulfillment of its intended meaning through an accompanying act 
of employment. That it is usable, in fact usable in a definite direction, is for the tool neither acci-
dental nor unessential, as it is for the work of art; rather, to be usable is present throughout the 
entire structure of the tool’s signifying content.” 
Thus, a technological artifact is, in two different respects, part of a whole: As a solidified 
fragment of a total action it takes part in particular sequences of action which are more or less 
purposefully designed to bring about particular results. This is the effect-related or functional set-
ting. These sequences of action, however, do not have their ends in themselves but are meaningful 
only within particular contexts of human life and work. This is the use-related or social setting. 
Because of their character as objectifications, the positions of technological artifacts within these 
two settings are fixed to some extent and their behavior is patterned. Additionally, they require 
patterned behavior from interacting entities. Adapting humans to such requirements is the task of 
“configuring the user”. (Woolgar, 1991).  
The minimal position field for the effect-related setting consists of the technological artifact 
and the operator, the operator being the position responsible for all parts of the sequence of action 
not delegated to the technological artifact. The minimal use-related position field consists of the 
artifact and the user. With many everyday technologies, the users are also the operators. In order 
to use them we operate our cars, coffee machines, or cameras ourselves, thus occupying two dif-
ferent positions at the same time. That these positions belong to different position fields becomes 
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obvious, when we leave these minimal constellations behind and move on to more complex set-
tings. For instance, to the setting that constituted the chauffeur problem. 
9. The chauffeur problem 
A market research survey by Daimler Motors in 1901 predicted that the global demand for auto-
mobiles would not exceed one million, due to a lack of available chauffeurs (cf. Häder, 2009: 28). 
This prediction is often quoted as an example of failed technological forecasts – but wrongly so. 
At that time, the availability of chauffeurs did indeed constitute a major bottleneck for the dissem-
ination of the automobile. According to contemporary sources, the chauffeur problem was “one of 
the most serious that the automobilist has to deal with” (cf. “Chauffeurs Lord it Over Their Em-
ployers”, New York Times, 12. August 1906). It was, in short, the problem to find employees for 
operating the automobile who were able and willing to assume a position comparable to the position 
of coachman. 
The first motor vehicles looked like carriages without horses, and that is exactly what they 
were called: “horseless carriages”. The analogy between carriages and automobiles, however, was 
much more far-reaching. At the turn of the 20th century it still was a widely shared belief in the 
USA “that in both use and ownership, horseless carriages would occupy roughly the same roles in 
American life as horses; few predicted that the new machines would radically transform basic daily 
routines or practices” (Wells, 2007: 501). The carriage with a privately hired coachman was the 
usual means of individual transportation for wealthy Americans of the 19th century. “The coachman 
acted as a superintendent of transportation. […] He supervised the actions of underlings such as 
grooms and stable hands, took responsibility for the ordering and inspection of fodder and bedding, 
supervised the feeding, dieting, blanketing, shoeing, and grooming of the horses, inspected and 
maintained the condition of carriages and harness, and drove whenever the owner or his wife used 
the carriage” (Borg, 1999: 800). Wealthy American automobile owners simply transposed this job 
description to the position of chauffeur, “they hired chauffeurs, dressed them in livery, and gave 
them responsibility for the care and maintenance of their vehicles, transposing the rules associated 
with horse transportation to their new horseless carriages” (p. 803). Defining the position of chauf-
feur in analogy to the position of coachman was an obvious idea for many reasons: Not only were 
early automobiles prone to breakdowns, they “also required much more intensive routine mainte-
nance than later models. During the motoring season […] the oil in most gasoline-powered vehicles 
had to be changed nearly every week. Valve seats had to be reground several times during the 
season and occasionally required regrinding while on road” (p. 805). 
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It required constant supervision, care, and maintenance to keep the early automobiles road-
worthy. In the case of the carriage, where the same applies, a particular occupation had been estab-
lished to cover this range of tasks, the position as hired coachman. Consequently, for wealthy 
American automobile owners it seemed quite natural to delegate these tasks to a similar occupa-
tional position: “a significant number of wealthy motorists employed chauffeurs, servants who 
would perform the duties of driver and mechanic: ‘coachmen’ for the automobile” (p. 806). The 
chauffeur’s job was not only “to drive whenever the owner or his wife used the car” (p. 806) but 
also to maintain and repair the automobile; “he might in addition supervise a wash boy, just as the 
coachman has done for the groom and the stable hand” (p. 806). To be available whenever needed, 
“employers typically expected that he, like the coachman before him, would live on the property 
with the automobile, receiving board and lodging in addition to his pay” (p. 806). 
However, not only was the chauffeur’s range of tasks defined along the lines of the coachman’s 
but so was his social position. The social position of the coachman was that of a servant within a 
strict master-servant hierarchy, a social relationship requiring from coachmen to display the proper 
deference and to obey orders without further comment. The coachman’s livery was “a clear out-
ward sign of servile status” (p. 801). Wealthy motorists expected their chauffeurs to occupy the 
same social position, to be as deferential and obedient as expected from coachmen, and “to wear 
servant’s livery, which one fashion observer described as ‘cut very nearly in the same manner as 
the coachman’s great coat’” (p. 806). 
Based on this historical reconstruction, the chauffeur problem can be described more precisely 
as the problem to find employees able and willing to assume the two positions that make a coach-
man and, accordingly, a chauffeur: the functional position with the responsibility of driving the 
vehicle and keeping it roadworthy, and the social position as deferential servant. At first, the pre-
vious coachmen were believed to be the ideal candidates for the new position of chauffeur. 
“Wealthy motorists clearly desired that their coachmen make the transition to chauffeur, because 
coachmen already knew their place. In the words of one editorial, the coachman ‘is better fitted for 
the work of a chauffeur than any other class of operatives, being imbued, first of all, with some 
measure of comprehension of his social position’” (p. 808). Though this indeed makes a coachman 
the ideal candidate for the social position of chauffeur, his background is of limited use for the 
functional position of chauffeur: “The knowledge and skills of animal husbandry did not neces-
sarily translate into mechanical ability. As another editor wrote, ‘The only attainments that a coach-
man, per se, has for the position of chauffeur are his familiarity with what are called the rules of 
the road and his knowledge of the social relations of the driver of a vehicle to his employer […] 
the man who has a liking for the position of coachmen is not likely to have taste or talent for 
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mechanical work.’” (p. 808) Consequently, the attempts to retrain coachmen as chauffeurs mostly 
failed.  
It required the knowledge and skills of a mechanic to be able to repair and maintain early 
automobiles, yet people with such abilities refused to be treated as servants; “chauffeurs developed 
their own ideas about their social status. Their knowledge of the new technology placed them in 
high demand, and this fact gave them, in their estimation, a status distinctly above the coachman’s, 
more akin to the railroad engineer’s. […] As a consequence, many chauffeurs refused to wear liv-
ery, some balked at requests to do menial jobs such as washing the car or announcing the car’s 
arrival, and in Des Moines, Iowa, chauffeurs organized a strike against employers who required 
them to sleep in the same building with their machine” (p. 809-10). 
The chauffeur problem was only serious in the first decade of the 20th century. From then on, 
cars became much more reliable and the risk of breakdowns on the road decreased significantly. 
Driving cars became technically less demanding. “In this changing technical climate the wealthy 
motorist no longer needed to have his mechanic on board at all times” (p. 821). Repair and mainte-
nance became the job of mechanics at dealers’ shops or independent repair shops (cf. McIntyre, 
2000).The car production focused more and more on moderately- and low-priced cars for the 
broader market. They thus became available for people from less wealthy social classes which 
“could not afford, and did not desire, the services of a chauffeur-mechanic” (Borg, 1999: 821) but 
preferred to drive themselves. Many innovations such as the electric self-starter that replaced the 
hand crank (cf. Boyd, 1968) made driving easier, thus facilitating use by nonprofessional drivers. 
These developments had consequences for the functional and social position of chauffeur: “the 
chauffeurs of the second and third decades of the twentieth century were professional drivers, not 
mechanics, and their social position as servants was relatively stable and uncontested” (Borg, 1999: 
822). 
The chauffeur problem nicely illustrates the difference between the effect-oriented and the use-
oriented position fields of technological innovations. The early automobile gains its functional 
meaning as a means of individual transportation by taking part in a sequence of action which re-
quires not only a driver, but the constant maintenance and repair work from that driver as another 
part of this same action sequence. Thus, the early automobile with its susceptibility to damage and 
the driver with mechanical skills constitute two interrelated positions in the functional position 
field of this transportation technology. The social context within which this rather effortful way to 
provide individual mobility was viewed as desirable was the wealthy private household. Members 
of the 19th century upper classes were used to enjoy the advantages of individual transportation. 
They were able and willing to pay for this privilege. And they were used to servants. The use-
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oriented position field of the automobile that emerged within this social context assigned to the 
automobile a position comparable to the carriage. This implied that the owner as a rule would not 
drive the vehicle himself but hire a driver who was expected to accept the social position of servant. 
The chauffeur problem results from tensions between the functional and the social position of 
chauffeur. The functional position required highly demanded skills from their occupants and thus 
provided them with some bargaining power. But at the same time the social position defined them 
as servants who should not contradict their masters. 
10. Role conflicts between functional and social positions 
The tension that leads to the chauffeur problem is, in the terminology of role theory, a role conflict. 
Role conflicts occur when occupants of positions are confronted with contradicting role expecta-
tions. Sociological role theory distinguishes between two forms of role conflicts (cf. Dahrendorf, 
1968 [1958]: 71-72; Merton, 1968 [1949]: 424-38). On the one hand it may happen that the occu-
pant of a position is confronted with different role expectations from the occupants of different 
other positions of the position field. A teacher who has to deal with different expectations by the 
students’ parents and the school board members is an example of this kind of role conflict. This is 
called an intra-role conflict or a role conflict within the role-set. On the other hand role expectations 
that are related to different positions of the occupant may contradict each other (inter-role conflict 
or role conflict within the status-set). The chauffeur problem is caused by a role conflict of this 
kind. The role expectations related to the position as skilled mechanic are incompatible with the 
role expectations related to the position as servant. Consequently, the chauffeur problem vanished 
as the functional position of chauffeur no longer required professional mechanical skills. Now, 
enough people were available again who were able to do the job and willing to accept the social 
position of servant. 
According to sociological role theory, a social structure can be described as a patterned ar-
rangement of positions and positional roles. Consequently, the existence and the relative stability 
of a social structure at a particular time depends on the positional roles being sufficiently adjusted 
to each other. Role conflicts, on the other hand, are sources of instability (cf. Merton, 1968 [1949]: 
424). As the example of the chauffeur problem suggests, the same applies to technological innova-
tions. The role conflict constituting the chauffeur problem definitely was a source of instability 
which – as reflected by the forecast of Daimler Motors – negatively affected the dissemination of 
the automobile for some time.  
It is not specific to this empirical case that interactions between the effect-related and the use-
related position field of a technology may lead to role conflicts. Thus, the success of a technological 
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innovation depends not only on mutually adapted roles within the functional and social position 
field. Because of the persons and objects that hold positions in both position fields, it also requires 
adjustments between the functional and social roles of these entities. In the following section, I will 
take a closer look at adjustments of this kind, using as an example the struggle in American cities 
of the 1910s and 1920s over who belongs in the streets and who does not. 
11. The invention of the jaywalker 
Today it is taken for granted that city streets are for motor vehicles, if not explicitly designated 
otherwise. Before the advent of the automobile, however, streets served as public spaces, open to 
a broad range of different uses: “Private, horse-drawn vehicles and city services (such as street 
cars, telephones, and water supply) depended on them. Pedestrians, pushcart vendors, and children 
at play used them as well” (Norton, 2007: 332). This did not change immediately with the advent 
of the automobile. Rather, in the early years of the automobile “most – including many motorists 
– would have agreed that streets were not for fast driving, and that motorists who drove faster than 
pre-automotive vehicles were alone responsible for any harmful consequences” (p. 335). The co-
existence of vehicles and pedestrians in the pre-automotive city street was facilitated by the low 
speed of horse-drawn vehicles. Thus, this arrangement could continue to exist only if motorists 
would moderate their speed accordingly. But, as Peter Norton (2007: 335) puts it, “[t]o those who 
bought and sold them, cars were vehicles capable of higher sustained speeds than horses […] Thus 
the automobile’s essential attributes put it at odds with prevailing perceptions of legitimate street 
use. Used as intended, the car was a misuser of streets.” 
The conflict implicated in the automobile’s higher speed is another example of a role conflict 
between effect-related and use-related positional roles. The sequence of actions providing individ-
ual transportation faster than with horse-drawn vehicles relies not only on the automobiles. Beside 
others, it also requires streets that are not blocked by obstacles such as pedestrians or playing chil-
dren. Thus, pedestrians who can be expected not to impede the motorized traffic on the street are 
part of this action sequence. The then established uses of the city street, however, allowed persons 
in the position of pedestrian to use the streets unrestrictedly. Conversely, it was required from per-
sons in the position of vehicle driver to take care. There are two opposite ways to solve this role 
conflict: Adapting the functional to the social roles, or vice versa. It is an interesting aspect of this 
historical case that both ways of solving the role conflict are relevant in the history of this case. 
Until the early 1920s, it was commonly viewed as the right of pedestrians to use the streets 
and as the duty of the motorists to take care not to harm them. Accordingly, in accidents between 
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automobiles and pedestrians, juries “tended to favor pedestrians” and to give them “almost invari-
ably […] the benefit of the doubt” (Norton, 2007: 337). This view of the rights and duties of mo-
torists and pedestrians was reflected by the speed limits of that time. “In 1906 the median state-
designated limit in cities was ten miles per hour, and local authorities often set limits still lower. 
States were slow to raise them; Indiana, which limited city speeds to eight miles per hour in 1906, 
had raised the limit to only ten by 1919” (p. 337). Yet the automobile’s capability of faster speeds 
provided a constant invitation to violate the role expectations attached to the position of driver and 
it proved difficult to effectively enforce such low speed limits. As a consequence, it was discussed 
by local officials and the public to equip cars with technical devices, so called “governors”, which 
would limit their speed. In 1923, a “letter writer to the St. Louis Star suggested this: ‘Gear them 
down to fifteen or twenty miles per hour and quit joking about speed limit laws’” (p. 338). In a 
survey from 1926 with about 500 American police chiefs participating, “two of every three police 
chiefs agreed that their cities should require governors on automobiles. Such a plan won mass 
support in Cincinnati, where 42,000 people – more than 10 percent of the population – signed 
petitions in 1923 for a local ordinance requiring governors that would shut off automobile engines 
at twenty-five miles per hour” (p. 339).  
All these are attempts to adapt the automobile and its use to the already established position 
field and its interrelated roles which until then had defined the use of the city streets. If these at-
tempts had succeeded, the role conflict would have been resolved by adapting functional roles to 
social roles. Yet the opposite solution prevailed, but only after the social position of pedestrian was 
successfully redefined so that it fitted as a functional position into the action sequence of providing 
individual transportation in the city at faster-than-horse speeds. 
It always depends on the envisaged contexts of use of technologies if and how the effects they 
provide are viewed as desired effects. In the early days of the automobile many people had a “horse-
minded” (Wells, 2007: 500) view on this artifact’s context of use, assuming, as cited above, that 
“horseless carriages would occupy roughly the same roles in American life as horses” (p. 501). 
According to this view, functional features of the automobile that could not be used within the 
context of use defined by the already existing role patterns of traffic behavior were judged as un-
desirable. This was the view of those fighting for the “pedestrians’ rights to the pavement” (Norton, 
2007: 337). However, with the increasing popularity of the car a more “motor-minded” (p. 352) or 
“mobility-minded” (Wells, 2007: 501-02) view grew stronger. Adherents to this view envisaged a 
context of use in which the superior speed and other advantages of the automobile over horse-
drawn vehicles would come into effect. In the countryside a major obstacle to this envisaged use 
22 
of the automobile was the poor quality of roads (cf. Wells, 2007: 501-02, 13-14). In the city, how-
ever, the chief obstacle was the behavior of the pedestrians. Thus, establishing a mobility-minded 
use of the car in the city “would require streets that were redefined as places where motorists be-
longed and where pedestrians were responsible for their own safety” (Norton, 2007: 339). This, 
however, required redefining the position of pedestrian in relation to the car and the car driver.  
From 1915 onwards, cities started marking crosswalks at intersections and tried to enforce 
their use. Yet as long as most people stuck to the “old common law rule that every person, whether 
on foot or driving, has equal rights in all parts of the roadway” (Norton, 2007: 351-52) these at-
tempts to redefine the position of pedestrians was of limited success. First and foremost, the estab-
lished customs had to be tackled. This is where the rhetoric of jaywalking came into play. “A jay 
was a country hayseed out of place in the city. By extension, a jaywalker was someone who did 
not know how to walk in the city” (p. 342). Originally, pedestrians were called jaywalkers who 
“obstructed other pedestrians by their irregular paths and their susceptibility to distraction by side-
walk vendors” (p. 343). Motorists and their advocacy groups adopted this term and started to use 
it as a rhetorical means of fighting the overcome traditions of street use. In this spirit, an article in 
the Washington Post in 1913 disparagingly described as jaywalkers people “‘who are so accus-
tomed to cutting across fields and village lots that they zigzag across city streets, scorning to keep 
to the crossings, ignoring their own safety’ and ‘impeding traffic.’” (“Jay” Walkers, Washington 
Post, 18 May 1913, cited in Norton, 2007: 342). It took some time and effort for the motorists and 
their advocates to succeed in redefining the once customary pedestrian life in the streets as jay-
walking. By exerting their influence on newspapers, car manufacturers, car dealers and automobile 
clubs caused a change in the newspaper coverage of accidents, to the effect that accidents were 
more often ascribed to jaywalking rather than to reckless driving (cf. 357). “By sponsoring safety 
education in schools, motordom made the next generation enemies of jaywalking. By the late 1920s 
AAA [American Automobile Association, author’s note] led the field in classroom safety instruc-
tion” (p. 358). By 1930 “jaywalking” had become a regular term used in everyday American Eng-
lish to designate the misuse of the street by pedestrians who obstruct automobiles. “The legitima-
tion of jaywalking as a term corresponded to its fall into disrepute as a practice” (p. 359). This was 
the “crucial step toward the reconstruction of city streets as motor thoroughfares” (p. 358). 
Vehicles, vehicle drivers, streets, pedestrians, playing children, and several other entities oc-
cupy positions in an effect-oriented field of interrelated positions that provides mobility and at the 
same time they occupy positions in a position field that defines the legitimate use of the mobility 
infrastructure. In the pre-automotive 19th century a somewhat viable balance between role require-
ments from both position fields had been reached. The higher speed individual transportation that 
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became technically feasible with the advent of the automobile, however, required these persons 
and objects to assume functional positions which were incompatible with their established social 
positions. To bring into effect the new capabilities of the automobile, these social positions had to 
be redefined as well. Consequently, overthrowing the overcome customs of street use was a major 
part of the innovation of motorized individual transportation. 
12. Innovations as socio-technical networks of positional roles 
To invent and to introduce a new technological artifact means to suggest a new way of producing 
effects for particular uses. Since the artifact constitutes only one of the interrelated positions nec-
essary to produce the effect and only one of the positions of the context of use, a technological 
innovation necessarily requires defining or redefining these other positions and the corresponding 
roles and role relations. According to Callon and Akrich, every technological innovation is neces-
sarily accompanied by the “delineation of a scenario” (Callon, 1986a: 26) which envisages these 
roles and role relations (cf. Akrich, 1992b: 208). To the degree that the role relations are inscribed 
in the technological artifact, the artifact itself “can be described as a scenario replete with a stage, 
roles, and directions governing the interactions between the actors (human and nonhuman) who are 
supposed to assume those roles” (Akrich, 1992a: 174). This is not to say that engineers are neces-
sarily aware of the scenarios implied in their artifacts. Rather, the underlying assumptions, espe-
cially the assumptions about the context of use are often, to some extent, tacit assumptions. Of 
course, as discussed above, this does not mean that the scenarios which are explicitly envisaged or 
tacitly presupposed by the engineers are the same scenarios that eventually become reality. As the 
examples above have shown, a developing innovation may be subject to a lot of different and com-
peting influences and thus the underlying scenario may change accordingly. 
According to Callon and Akrich, the technological innovation, as it is explicitly or implicitly 
envisaged in such scenarios, and as it becomes reality in the case of success, consists of a network 
of interrelated roles to be played by heterogeneous entities. I agree with this basic picture. But, as 
I have tried to show, by applying a more elaborate role-theoretical view, this picture becomes much 
more detailed and precise. Above all, it is crucial to add the mechanism by which roles are proposed 
to, and assumed by the persons and objects involved: By defining positions and by occupying them. 
The notion that there is an essential difference between a position and the holder of a position is, 
as we have seen, of major importance for the analysis of socio-technical networks. Because of this 
difference a position usually does not demand the whole person or object so that persons and ob-
jects can occupy different positions at the same time. Only when taking this into account does it 
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become possible to understand how the components of a socio-technical network can play roles in 
producing technological effects, and in shaping social settings at the same time. 
The chauffeur problem and the invention of the jaywalker show that the role requirements of 
social positions may lead to redefinitions of functional positions and vice versa. Analyzed with the 
means of role theory it turns out that these adjustments became necessary because of role conflicts 
resulting from the fact that the occupants of the social position in question occupied a functional 
position at the same time or vice versa. These observations confirm the conceptual assumption that 
technological innovations, insofar as they are new ways to produce effects for particular uses, con-
sist of an effect-related and a use-related position field which are related to each other. It is because 
of this structure that technological artifacts, and as we have seen, other components of socio-tech-
nical networks as well, are able and are often required to occupy positions in both position fields.  
The examples of the preceding sections may have given the impression that there is always a 
trade-off between functional and social role requirements. However, this is true only in the case of 
role conflicts and only if these conflicts have to be resolved and cannot be neutralized otherwise. 
And just as functional role requirements may prevail over social role requirements so the opposite 
may occur. Obviously, there is space for possible compromises between these poles. Additionally, 
it should be noted that the role requirements imposed by different positions are not necessarily 
competing requirements. Often it is perfectly possible for persons or objects to conform to the 
different role requirements of their different positions, since they are engaged in each of them with 
only some of their attributes, capabilities and resources. 
It is obvious from the examples above, that human actors who assume use-related or effect-
related positions in a socio-technical network at the same time occupy several other positions as 
well. It is important to see that the same may be true with objects as well. Cars for instance, may, 
in addition to their functions and uses, play a symbolic role as means of social distinction. Living 
room lamps may be chosen because of their aesthetic features rather than their functionality or 
usability. These are phenomena made possible by the positional structure of socio-technical net-
works, namely, by the fact that assuming effect-related or use-related positions does not per se 
preclude their occupants from also assuming further positions. As with functional and use-related 
positions, these additional positions may or may not interfere with the person’s or object’s other 
positions. For example, the streamlined design of a car that makes it look sporty and fast may in 
fact worsen its drag coefficient, and the artistic design of a lamp may negatively affect its ratio of 
light yield to energy consumption. On the other hand, these objects could have also been designed 
according to the design principle “form follows function.” However, even a lamp with a poor light 
yield or a car with dysfunctional streamlining are still technological artifacts as long as they are 
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used because of their contributions to the production of desired effects and thus keep playing their 
functional and use-related roles within the socio-technical network of the respective technology.  
13. Conclusion 
To explain technology through social factors is, according to Latour, as wrong as to believe that 
the behavior of people is caused by the diffusion of technology. “Social determinism courageously 
fights against technical determinism, whereas neither exist except in the fanciful descriptions pro-
posed by the diffusion model” (Latour, 1987: 141). According to Latour (1987: 141) this is because 
technological determinism and social constructivism share the wrong idea that there are distinct 
“spheres of Science, Technology, and Society, where the influence and impact of each of them on 
the other have to be studied”. In contrast, he argues: “Understanding what facts and machines are 
is the same task as understanding who the people are. If you describe the controlling elements that 
have been gathered together you will understand the groups which are controlled. Conversely, if 
you observe the new groups which are tied together, you will see how machines work and what 
facts are hard. The only question in common is to learn which associations are stronger and which 
weaker. We are never confronted with science, technology, and society, but with a gamut of weaker 
and stronger associations” (p. 140).  
Obviously, there are a lot of relevant scientific and non-scientific perspectives from which 
understanding what machines and who people are is definitely not the same task. To ignore this is 
to unduly stretch the principle of symmetry. On the other hand, it is not an option to return to the 
antagonistic distinction between social constructivism and technological determinism which leaves 
the observer blind to the interrelatedness of social and technical arrangements. The role-theoretical 
approach to socio-technical networks shows a way out of this dilemma. Understanding human ac-
tors and technological artifacts is the same task (or at least a similar task) where humans or objects 
act as role-taking occupants of positions within the same position field. It becomes a more different 
task where they occupy positions within different position fields. In both cases the task becomes 
even more different when the humans act as role-makers as well. Thus, the role-theoretical per-
spective allows to conceptually integrate similarities and differences between humans and artifacts. 
Accordingly, similarities between humans and artifacts are due to the fact that they both may act 
as occupants of positions. However, they may hold positions in different position fields, positions 
in use-related or other social or cultural position fields, or positions in effect-related, functional 
position fields. And these differences are as important for understanding socio-technical networks 
as those similarities.  
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